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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920536-CA
Priority No. 2

BRYANT R. WILSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a),
whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may take an
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Appendix 1:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6
Utah R. Crim. P. 11
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court fail to strictly comply with the

Rule 11 requirements for accepting a guilty plea?

"Gibbons . . .

held that Rule 11(5) 'squarely places on trial courts the burden of

ensuring that constitutional and Rule [11(5)] requirements are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered.'"

State v. Hoff, 814

P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1312 (Utah 1987); State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App.
1991) ("Since questions of constitutional rights are questions of
law, we give no deference to the trial court's conclusion . . . " ) ;
State v. Petersen, 810 P. 2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) ("trial courts do
not have discretion to misapply the law").
2.

Should the guilty plea be withdrawn because the former

trial attorney was ineffective in his representation?

To be

ineffective, counsel's performance must be (a) adjudged "deficient"
[falling below an objective standard of reasonableness]; and (b) such
performance must prejudice the outcome of the proceeding. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'q denied, 467 U.S.
1267 (1984); State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for theft
by deception, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-405.

(R 104, 106, 328, 364). On May 13, 1993, this Court

granted Bryant Wilson's "motion for certificate of probable cause."1

1
In its Order granting Mr. Wilson's motion for
certificate of probable cause, this Court noted, "[t]he State
conceded in open court that the appeal raises a substantial question
of law or fact, likely to result in reversal, an order for a new
trial, or a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in
jail . . . " See Appendix 2. The issues presented in this appeal
are identical to the issues presented in Mr. Wilson's previously
filed motion.

- 2 -

See Appendix 2 (attached is a copy of this Court's Order, dated May
13, 1993).

Since the proceedings which occurred prior to that time

play an integral role in this appeal,2 they will be discussed at
length below.

See infra Statement of the Facts; Point II.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On September 11, 1991, Mr. Bryant Wilson and Mr. Steven
Todd "were charged with one count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity
and multiple counts of Theft by Deception."

See Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, dated March 5, 1993 (Factual Finding, pi)
(p = paragraph) (attached as Appendix 3); (R 13-46).

John Bucher,

Grant Morrison, and Ray Stoddard initially represented Bryant and
Steven, although the trial court found that "John Bucher was the
controlling attorney on the case[.]"

Factual Findings, pp2 & 3.

Mr. Greg Skordas represented the State of Utah.

Factual Finding, p4.

As part of the plea bargaining process, "Mr. Skordas had
prepared a statement wherein he agreed in behalf of the State to
stipulate to a plea withdrawal if [Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] were
committed to prison."

Factual Finding, p5. Mr. Skordas'

representations included the following:

2
Bryant Wilson's brief on appeal stems from two separate
trial court orders. On May 26, 1992, the trial court denied
Mr. Wilson's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (R 129-30).
Mr. Wilson then appealed another trial court order, dated March 5,
1993, (R 325-29), which resulted from this Court's Order of remand.
(R 299-300). At no time did the State file a notice of appeal.
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John [Bucher],
As further inducement to settle this case, the
State will affirmatively recommend that the defendants
be granted probation & that if they are committed,
contrary to the State's recommendation, to prison, we
will stipulate to a plea withdrawel [sic] on both
defendants, on all counts.
[/s/] Greg Skordas

12/30/91

See (R 123, 304) (emphasis in original) (a copy of the letter is
attached as Appendix 4).
Pursuant to Mr. Skordas7 letter and in accordance with the
representations by John Bucher, Bryant Wilson and Steven Todd both
pleaded guilty to one count of "Pattern of unlawful activity" and
one count of "Theft by deception."

See (R 82-88; 175-92).

"Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise the
[trial court] of the agreement."

Factual Findings, p6.

After the trial court noted the thirty (30) day time period
for withdrawing the guilty pleas, counsel for Mr. Wilson and
Mr. Todd waived the time limitations for the sentencing proceeding.
(R 185, 192). Initially set for January 27, 1992,3 sentencing was
subsequently continued until March 9, 1992.

(R 192-93).

Mr. John

3
The referral forms for the sentencing proceedings were
found in the court file. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd both indicated
that they did not receive the referral form (either a copy of the
form or the original), which, in turn, led to a request by John
Bucher to continue the matter in order to allow for the preparation
of a presentence investigation report. (R 195). The State disputes
whether both men received the forms, although the fact remains that
John Bucher never made a companion request to extend the thirty day
time period for withdrawing the guilty plea.
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Bucher did not at any time request the trial court to extend the
thirty day time period for withdrawing the guilty pleas.
On March 9, 1992, the trial court sentenced Mr. Wilson to
an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison on count one (a second degree felony), and a zero-to-five
year term on count two (a third degree felony).

The terms ran

concurrently, with commitment beginning "forthwith".

(R 208).

The

court imposed the same sentence on Mr. Todd and ordered both men to
pay restitution.

The parties agreed that a restitution hearing

would be needed to determine the exact amounts owed and the persons
who were entitled to collect restitution.

(R 195, 201, 208-09).

The hearing, however, was never held.
Not only did defense counsel fail to extend the thirty day
time period for withdrawing the guilty pleas, counsel failed to seek
withdrawal of the pleas until March 24, 1992, (R 109), almost three
months after the pleas had been initially entered.

Defense counsel

failed to recognize that he should have used Mr. Skordas' letter and
stipulation as a basis for withdrawing the pleas.

(R 123).

When

John Bucher finally moved to withdraw the guilty pleas, Mr. Skordas,
in contravention of his prior letter agreement that he would
stipulate to such an action, opposed the withdrawal motion.
(R 113-116).

On May 26, 1992, the trial court denied the request to

withdraw the guilty pleas.

(R 130).

In a letter dated June 19, 1992, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd
petitioned the trial court to appoint new counsel to handle their
appeal.

(R 135).

The letter alleged and the Utah State Bar
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confirmed that John Bucher had been suspended from the practice of
law.

(R 135); Utah B.J., Vol. 5, No. 7, page 26 (August/September

1992).4

The trial court granted the motion to appoint appellate

counsel and on August 5, 1992, the court appointed the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Ass'n as counsel for this appeal.

(R 146-51).

On behalf of their respective clients, newly appointed
counsel then petitioned this Court for a certificate of probable
cause.

On October 15, 1992, this Court temporarily remanded both

cases "to the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of
fact relevant to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel."

(R 299).

On remand, during the December 14, 1992, proceedings,

4
The notice in the Utah Bar Journal reads, inter alia,
"On May 19, 1992, the Supreme Court entered an Order suspending John
R. Bucher from the practice of law for a minimum period of 6 months
and 1 day pursuant to Rule XIX, SUSPENSION FOR DISABILITY, of the
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. This Order was
entered pursuant to Discipline by Consent wherein Mr. Bucher
stipulated to this action in settlement of the complaints, described
hereinafter, which charged that he violated Rules 1.3, (Diligence),
Rule 1.7, (Conflict of Interest), Rule 1.13(b) (Safekeeping of
Property), Rule 1.14 (Declining or Terminat[ing] Representation),
and Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct). The factual allegations for those
cases are stated more fully in the Bar Journal [and are matters
unrelated to the case at bar].
In the present case, Mr. Bucher was paid "$7200 worth of
brand new furniture and about $4,000 cash" for "services" which
amounted to little more than the entry of plea proceeding and the
sentencing proceeding. (R 270). Mr. Bucher told Bryant Wilson and
Steven Todd to waive the preliminary hearing because it was a waste
of time. (R 270-71). Notwithstanding an initial $4,000 payment and
claims that "this [amount] is all you need to pay me and I'll take
this case to trial [,]•' (R 259), Bucher's requests for money did not
cease. However, neither case ever went to trial and the money was
not returned.
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Bryant Wilson testified that John Bucher, the initial trial counsel,
guaranteed him and Mr. Todd that they would not go to prison (or
jail) because of the prosecuting attorney's letter and stipulation.
(R 251).

If, as Mr. Skordas represented, the State's recommendation

of probation was not followed, both men could withdraw their guilty
plea and proceed to trial.

John Bucher also told Bryant and Steven

that they should not disclose the existence of the letter to the
court.

In addition, Mr. Bucher told Bryant and Steven that during

their colloquy with the court, they should not respond in a manner
which could jeopardize the agreed upon arrangement.

(R 253-54).

Mindful of John Bucher's instructions and his assurances
that they had the prosecutor's letter to fall back on, Bryant Wilson
and Steven Todd entered their guilty pleas to the agreed upon
offenses.

Shortly thereafter, however, Bryant and Steven both told

Mr. Bucher that they wanted to change their pleas.
declined to comply with his client's requests.

Mr. Bucher

(R 257).

The prosecuting attorney during the remanded proceedings,
Mr. Greg Skordas, chose not to cross-examine Bryant Wilson.
Mr. Skordas further stipulated that if Mr. Todd were asked the same
series of questions as Mr. Wilson, their testimony would be
substantially the same.

(R 272).

Mr. Skordas did not testify about

his prior involvement in these proceedings, nor did he call any
witnesses to rebut Mr. Wilson's uncontroverted statements.
When Bryant stepped down from the witness stand, his
current counsel (Ms. Karen Stam) informed the trial court that prior
counsel (Mr. John Bucher) led Bryant to believe that when he entered
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into the plea agreement, withdrawal was a "legitimate legal option"
available to them should their expectations under the plea agreement
not materialize.

The court did not dispute that Mr. Bucher's

statements corroborated those of Mr. Wilson; the court only
expressed concern that it was not apprised of the arrangements
agreed upon by defense counsel and the prosecutor, Mr. Skordas.
But see Factual Finding, p22 ("Defendant Wilson testified

(R 274).5

5

The pertinent discussion follows:

Ms. Stam: . . . Other than what has been testified to here
today, I do believe there's a number of corroborating
factors in the transcript and I call the court's attention
particularly to pages 38 and 39 in the [May 18, 1992]
transcript in which Mr. Bucher says that [Mr. Wilson and
Mr. Todd] were under the supposition when they entered into
that plea that they believed that was a legitimate legal
option for them to do.
And I think that corroborates what you heard today both
from Mr. Wilson—
The court:

The only thing is that no one told the court.

Ms. Stam: Well, your honor, that's true and we certainly
we don't hold it against the court.
In terms of your prior rulings, . . . I don't think they
[Mr. Bucher and Mr. Stoddard] felt it was in their interest
to bring this up, but basically, I feel when the court
looks at this in combination with the record, you'll see
that [Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] were in fact misled by the
ineffective assistance of their counsel, . . .
(R 273-74) (emphasis added). Page 38 of the referred to transcript
reads:
Mr. Bucher: There's the State's agreement to allow me to
withdraw the guilty plea in case there is a prison
sentence. That's what the agreement says, your honor.
The court:

Well, I'm not bound by that.

Mr. Bucher: But I am—the only way I can make an argument
you're bound is that [Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] were under

- 8

-

at the hearing and his testimony was contradictory to his statements
made at the time his plea was taken") .
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court
"concluded that the Defendants were not credible witnesses."
(R 328); see generally Appendix 3 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, dated Friday, March 5, 1993).

"It 'belies credibility' to

think that Defendants would not say anything to either the Court or
their counsel when the Court sentenced them to prison."
Conclusion, p2.

Legal

"The [trial] [c]ourt cannot make a finding of

ineffective counsel because there was no credible evidence presented
that Mr. Bucher was ineffective."

Legal Conclusion, p3.

"The

[trial] [c]ourt will allow Defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas
to Count I because of the omission in the Information, but not
because the guilty pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily."
Legal Conclusion, p4.

"The [trial] [c]ourt denies defendants'

Motion to Withdraw their guilty pleas to Count II." Legal
Conclusion, p5.
As she had done the previous week, Ms. Stam, on Monday,
March 8, 1993, again requested the trial court to consider the

5 -[footnote cont'd]that supposition when they entered into that plea that they
believed that this was a legitimate legal option for them
to do. And if you have a plan under that illusion, disillusion, or improper representation of reality, whatever
you call it, if that's what he thinks, the plea is no good
and he should be allowed to withdraw it, in all fairness.
(R 214) (emphasis added).
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affidavit of Mr. John Bucher, a certified document which essentially
eviscerated the trial court's legal conclusions.

(R 320-23).

Even

though Mr. Bucher's own interest would have been best served by
covering up or disavowing the allegations made at the ineffective
proceeding, John conceded that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd had
immediately asked him to withdraw the pleas.

Bucher first

acknowledged that the guilty pleas were entered on December 30,
1991.

He then attested that, "Within two days of the entry of the

defendants7 guilty pleas, both defendant's came to my office and
Todd ask[ed] me to withdraw his guilty plea."
(Affidavit of John R. Bucher).

(R 323); Appendix 5

John "advised the defendants that

the motion was premature and that the motion should not be filed
until the trial court sentenced them."

(R 323). As stated

previously, sentencing was on March 9, 1992, and Bucher did not move
to withdraw the guilty pleas until March 24, 1992.

(R 109, 117).

The trial court refused to amend its order in accordance
with Mr. Bucher's concessions.

Mr. Wilson appealed this ruling by

the trial court, (R 387); the State did not appeal.

The remanded

matter then was returned to this Court to address the merits of his
petition for a certificate of probable cause.
On May 13, 1993, "[t]he State conceded in open court that
the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, likely to
result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a sentence that
does not include a term of imprisonment in jail, . . . "

This Court

then granted Mr. Wilson's motion for a certificate of probable

- 10 -

cause.

The appeal now before this Court reiterates the issue(s)

previously conceded by the State.6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court failed to strictly comply with the Rule 11
requirements for accepting a guilty plea.

It did not determine "if

the tendered plea [was] a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement [had] been reached[.]"
Crim. P. 11(5)(f).

Utah R.

The "on the record" colloquy and the plea

agreement both failed to disclose the pivotal role of the "behindthe-scenes" plea agreement.
The trial court additionally erred in not allowing
Mr. Wilson to withdraw his plea in light of prior trial counsel's
ineffective representation.

The actions and inactions of prior

counsel at times prior to and after the "entry of plea" proceedings
were deficient and prejudical to the outcome.

A new trial is

required.

6
Mr. Steven Todd, a codefendant in this matter, was also
granted a certificate of probable cause for reasons identical to
those conceded by the State in Mr. Wilson's case. See Mr. Steven
Todd's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Petition for
Certificate of Probable Cause, dated May 6, 1993 (because the
circumstances relating to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd have been treated
as one and the same, where applicable Mr. Wilson incorporates by
reference the arguments stated in Mr. Todd's Memorandum) (attached
as Appendix 6); see also State v. Todd, Case No. 920536-CA (Utah
App. brief filed July 1, 1993).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF RULE 11
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court declared: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts
the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e)
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered,"

740

P.2d at 1312; see also State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581 n.2 (Utah
App. 1992) (noting that former Rule 11(e) has been replaced in part
by Rule 11(5)).

In State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992) (per

curiam) (on petition for rehearing), the Court restated its "holding
that (1) strict compliance with the elements of rule 11 is required
in the taking of guilty pleas and (2) said compliance may be
demonstrated on appeal by reference to the record of the plea
proceedings.

When plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the

record (as when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that
the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the
information contained therein), they may properly form a part of the
basis for finding rule 11 compliance."

830 P.2d at 217 (emphasis

added).
Much emphasis has been placed on the plea agreement and the
prosecutor's letter that he would stipulate to a withdrawal in the
event the trial court imposed a term of imprisonment.

(R 123).

The

court took issue with the fact that the letter which induced the
plea was never brought to its attention.
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See Factual Finding, p6

("Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise the
[trial] [c]ourt of the agreement").
Aside from the problems accompanying the nondisclosure of
the plea agreement, see Appendix 6, the trial court had the burden
of "ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11[5] requirements are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered."

Gibbons, 740 P.2d

at 1312. The court here failed to comply with paragraph (f) of
Rule 11(5).

The court was required to determine "if the tendered

plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and
if so, what agreement has been reached[.]"

Utah R. Crim.

P. 11(5)(f).
During the December 30, 1991, entry of plea proceedings,
the trial court initially explained that "even though there may be a
recommendation made here by the State and Counsel, I don't have to
follow them.

And after receiving the presentence report you

[Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd] just may leave right from here and go
right out to the prison."

(R 178).

When the court conducted the

plea colloquy with Mr. Todd, it addressed "promises" only in regards
to the possible sentence which could be imposed:

"Now, as I [the

court] have explained to you [Mr. Todd], I have not made any
promises as to the sentence that will be imposed upon you."
(R 181).

The court, though, said nothing about promises or

inducements in regards to the plea agreement and whether "the
tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached[.]"
Crim. P. 11(5)(f).
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Utah R.

The trial court's colloquy with Mr. Wilson was no better:
"Now, as I [the court] explained to you [Mr. Wilson] before, and you
heard it explained to Mr. Todd here, that there have been no
promises made by this court as to the sentence that will be imposed
upon you.

On the date of sentencing after I get the presentence

report, you could leave forthwith from here and go right to the
prison."

(R 188). Again, the court's references to "promises" were

made only in relation to the sentence which could be imposed.
Nothing was explored in regards to whether "the tendered plea is a
result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so,
what agreement has been reached[.]"

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(f).

The

trial court colloquy failed to comply with the requirements of
Rule 11.
In addition, the standard preprinted clauses in the plea
affidavits were not properly incorporated into the "on the record"
plea colloquy.

While affidavits may be "used to aid Rule 11

compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing.

The trial

court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant
understands the affidavit and voluntarily signed it. . . . Any
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during
the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of
the plea colloquy.

Then the affidavit itself, signed by the

required parties, can be incorporated into the record."

Maguire,

830 P.2d at 217-18 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah
App. 1991) (citations omitted)).
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Not only did the trial court here fail to address
paragraph (f) of Rule 11 during the on the record colloquy, the
court,s brief reference to the affidavit also was of no aid in
meeting the paragraph (f) requirement.

See Maquire, 830 P.2d at 217

(emphasis added) ("plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the
record fas when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that
the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the
information contained therein]").

The court only made broad,

conclusory statements and its reference to Mr. Wilson's affidavit
did not mention the plea agreement or the paragraph (f) requirement:
The court: What is your plea then to counts—first of
all, do you have any questions about the procedures
here today, about the elements or any part of the
proceedings?
[Bryant] Wilson:

No, sir.

The court: Are you willing to sign this statement in
open court, then?
[Bryant] Wilson: Yes.
Mr. Morrison:

We got it here, your honor.

The court: Oh, this is Mr. Todd's. I was reading
from Mr. Todd's on the facts.
Are you willing to sign the statement in open
court?
[Bryant] Wilson: Yes.

The court: Okay. Sign the statement in open court.
The record may indicate the defendant [Bryant
Wilson] has signed the statement in open court, and
the court further finds that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty fully
understanding the elements of the crime.

- 15 -

(R 190-91).7
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever held
that such a general reference to an affidavit satifies the
requirements of Rule 11.

See e.g., State v. Hoff# 814 P.2d 1119,

1123 (Utah 1991) ("The practice of simply relying on defense
attorneys and plea affidavits to explain the waiver of
constitutional rights and to determine that a guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary in every significant respect was deemed
insufficient, and the burden was placed on the judge"); State v.

7
The trial court7s colloquy and reference to Mr. Todd's
affidavit was similarly deficient:
The court: Would you [Mr. Todd] sign that statement
now in open court. Now do you have any questions,
whatsoever, before you sign the statement?
[Steven] Todd:
The court:

Do you understand what you're doing?

[Steven] Todd:
The court:

Um-hum.

Yes, sir.

Your answer is yes?

[Steven] Todd:
The court:

No sir, I don't.

Yes, sir.

Go ahead and sign the statement, then.

Mr. Bucher. The record should reflect the defendant
has signed the statement and I'm presenting it back to
the court.
The court: Okay. May the record indicate the
defendant has executed the statement in open court.
The court finds that the defendant, fully
understanding the elements of the crime, knowingly and
voluntarily entered his plea of guilty.
(T 184-85).
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Valencia, 776 P. 2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam) (if "an
affidavit or form is signed by the accused and used as part of the
guilty plea to evidence his or her understanding of the charged
offense and the waiver of certain rights, that statement cannot
serve as a mere substitute for the full and complete examination on
the record by the trial court that is required by [Rule 11]").
Indeed, if the blanket incorporation of affidavits were allowed, the
entry of plea proceedings would be no more than a one or two minute
oral colloquy, assuming the written clauses in the affidavit
complied with the Rule 11 requirements (e.g. the court: do you
understand the contents of the affidavit?

the defendant: yes; the

court: do you have any questions? the defendant: no). Cf. State v.
Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594, 595 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) ("The failure to
conduct an adequate colloquy is correctly characterized as a
violation of the common law rule established in Gibbons"), disavowed
on other grounds, State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Utah
1992)
Although the affidavits for Mr. Wilson and Mr. Todd both
contained the preprinted clause regarding plea bargains, (R 74-75,
pl3; 85-86, pl3), that clause and the affidavits as a whole were not
properly incorporated for purposes of complying with Rule 11.
Having failed to comply with Rule 11(f) either through the "on the
record" plea colloquy or by proper incorporation of the affidavits,
the trial court improperly accepted the involved guilty pleas.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING JOHN BUCHER
INEFFECTIVE IN HIS REPRESENTATIONS OF MR. BRYANT WILSON
At the outset, Mr. Wilson notes that the issue here is not
whether the trial court's sentence improperly ignored the State's
recommendation of probation.

Rather, the primary concern is whether

John Bucher's performance was (1) "deficient" (whether it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness); and (2) whether the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding.

See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 U.S.
1267 (1984); State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

In

short, even if the trial court's order of imprisonment was
appropriate, were the actions or inactions of Mr. Bucher deficient
at any time prior to or after the entry of the guilty pleas?
A.

JOHN BUCHER PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY WHEN HE ADVISED
MR. WILSON THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE COURT DID
AT SENTENCING, THE PROSECUTOR'S LETTER ALLOWED
HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA

As part of the plea negotiation process, John Bucher
obtained a letter from the prosecutor, Greg Skordas, wherein
Mr. Skordas stipulated to the withdrawal of Mr. Wilson's and
Mr. Todd's pleas in the event the trial court did not grant them
probation.

(R 123).

While the prosecuting attorney's letter may

have led Bryant and Steven to reasonably believe that it allowed
them to avoid imprisonment, Mr. Bucher acted deficiently when he
told his clients that the letter had more value than the trial court
may have chosen to give it.

(R 260) ("He [John Bucher] kept
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stressing how powerful that letter was and he guaranteed we [Bryant
and Steven] couldn't go to jail or prison at that time because of
the [prosecutor's] letter"); (R 255) (Bucher told Bryant and Steven:
"You guys do not realize the power of this letter . . . Regardless
of what . . . Judge Rokich does at sentencing, we can approach him
with that letter and we can change the plea regardless and you won't
go to jail or prison at that time").
By statute, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6(2)(a).

In short, Mr. Bucher unreasonably represented that

the prosecutor's letter constituted "good cause."

Cf. State v.

Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991) ("The determination of
whether good cause exists to withdraw a criminal plea traditionally
rests within the discretion of the trial court.

However, a trial

court errs when it refuses to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea
. . . that was not entered in strict compliance with [Utah R. Crim
P.]ll(5) and (7)"); State v. Ross, 804 P.2d 112, 117 (Ariz. App.
1990) ("To falsely inform a defendant of the consequences of his
plea agreement, or to fail to honor the terms of the plea agreement,
violates constitutional due process").

Since the "good cause"

determination is left to the trial court, Bucher misrepresented the
strength of the letter and improperly used it to induce the guilty
pleas.
The prejudice is obvious.

"But for" Mr. Bucher's deficient

performance, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, Bryant
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Wilson would not have agreed to the plea bargain agreement.
(R 255).

Bryant would have proceeded to trial.
B.

JOHN BUCHER PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY WHEN HE FAILED
TO EXTEND THE TIME PERIOD FOR WITHDRAWING THE
PLEA OR FOR NOT COMPLETING THE SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE STATED TIME PERIOD

Withdrawing a guilty plea not only requires "good cause,"
it also must be withdrawn "within 30 days after the entry of the
plea."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b); see State v. Price, 837 P.2d

578 (Utah App. 1992).

John Bucher performed deficiently when he

failed to either extend the time period for withdrawing the plea or
for not completing the sentencing proceedings within the thirty day
time period.

The record does not reflect Bucher making any

appropriate motions; in fact, Bucher7s own statements show that he
"waive[d] the minimum and maximum time for sentencingf.]"

(R 185)

(waiver for Mr. Todd); accord (R 192) (Mr. Wilson's time for
sentencing also was waived); cf. Factual Finding, p3 (John Bucher
was the controlling attorney).
Bucher additionally admitted that even though both Bryant
Wilson and Steven Todd immediately asked him to withdraw their
pleas, Bucher "advised [them] that the motion was premature and that
the motion should not be filed until the trial court sentenced
them."

(R 323).

Absent a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel, Bucher7s inactions in light of the time constraints
effectively foreclosed the opportunity to withdraw the guilty
pleas.

See Price, 837 P.2d at 582.
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C.

JOHN BUCHER'S REPRESENTATION, WHEN VIEWED IN PART
OR AS A WHOLE, WAS DEFICIENT

The above discussion and the attached arguments from
Mr, Steven's Todd's "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petition
for Certificate of Probable Cause", filed May 6, 1993, see
Appendix 6, provided the basis for the State's concession "in open
court that [their] appeal raises a substantial question of law or
fact, likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a
sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment in
jail, . . . "

Due to the State's concession and in an attempt to

avoid unnecessary repetition, Mr. Wilson attaches and incorporates
the arguments set forth in Mr. Todd's supplemental memorandum.

See

Appendix 6.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Bryant Wilson respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw the
guilty plea and to remand the case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

fi

day of July, 1993.

RONALD S>FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

KAREN J. STAM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

0

day of July, 1993.

S ^^T"
RONALD S. FUJINO

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of July, 1993
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APPENDIX 1

76-6-405* Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over proper ty of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary tignifiramne, or puffing by statements
imiikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means
an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.

T7-13-3. Withdrawal of plea.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon rood
cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is ™»H» by
eJ^S^9 a n d a h a U ** m a d e w i t f a i a 3 0 **** a f t e r t h e mtrT °f the plea,
(3) This section does not restrict the rights cf an imprisoned oerson undar
Bule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
™P™onea person under

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre*
seated by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason*
able time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for triaL A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early triaL In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
triaL
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
(0 Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be che ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court,
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea.
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(0 With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(Amended effective May I, 1993.)
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cierK of the Court

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 920535-CA
v.
Bryant R. Wilson,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon (Law and Motion).
This matter is before the court on a motion for certificate
of probable cause. The State conceded in open court that the
appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, likely to
result in reversal, an order for a new trial, or a sentence that
does not include a term of imprisonment in jail, if appellant is
successful on appeal.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, based upon the State's
concession, and our further determination that the appeal is not
taken for the purpose of delay, the motion for certificate of
probable cause is granted, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded
to the trial court with directions to make the determination
required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10(1)(c) (1990), and for
imposition of appropriate conditions of release under section 7720-10(2).

.

i # -

Dated thxs Q
BY THE COURT:

day of May, 1993.

'st*~S

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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XS THZ DISTRICT COURT 07 THZ THIRD
lM*ifGiMK

XN AND 7CR SALT TJlgg COUHTY, STATS 07 UTAH

STATS 07 UTAH,

FXHDINGS 07 TACT ABB
CONCLUSIONS 07 LAW

Plaintiff /Appellee,
CASE NO.
911901397
Appeal No. 920535 CA

vs.
STEVEN RICHARD TODD,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATS 07 UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CASH NO.
91190139t£
Appeal No. 920536 CA

vs.
BRZANT R. WILSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

This Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Lav.
1.

Defendants were charged with one count of Pattern of

Unlawful Activity and multiple counts of Theft by Deception.
2.

They were represented by John Bucher, Grant Morrison, and

Ray Stoddard.
3.

John Bucher was the controlling attorney on the case; the

other lawyers were acting at his direction.
4.

Mr. Skordas of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office

represented the State of Utah.

00325

STAT2 V, TODD AND WILSON

5.

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Skordas had prepared a statement wherein be agreed in

behalf of the State to stipulate to a plea withdrawal if defendants
were committed to prison.
6.

Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise

the Court of the agreement.
7.

Defendants are knowledgeable, appeared to be intelligent

and to have sufficient business acumen to operate a car brokerage
firm.
3.

While awaiting sentencing, defendants opened a modeling

agency business which is indicative of their business ability.
9.

The Court read the elements of Count I to the defendants

from the Information, citing Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(1),
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, but in the preparation of the
Information by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office an element
was omitted.
10.

Mr. Skordas and Mr. Bucher concurred that Title 76,

Chapter 10, Section 1603(1), tJtah Code Ann., 1953' as amended
constituted the elements of pattern of unlawful activity.
11.

The Court read to the defendants the elements of Count

II, Theft by Deception, from Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, Utah
Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

nn^ofi

STATE V. TODD AND WILSON
Mr

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

PAGZ THREE

Skordas and Ht

Bucher concurred that Title

r

Chapter 6, Section 405, seftforth the elements of Theft by

Defendants were asked if they had any question about the
elements of

crime or1 a ixy par t o f tiie p r o c e e d i n g s , a n d t h e i r

Court explained to the defendants that there have
been no promises made by the Court as to t h e sentence that woul
xm

pasea

IS.

U

p a n tihPTiu

The

advised

defendants

that

on the day of

sentencing they could UH ...FIII" >I iireet 1 f« hi *-ison.
"*

(Defendants nor counsel for the defendants

or for the

State of Utah uttered an objection to the Court's reference to
imprisonment.
17.

The Court found that the defendants had knowingly and

voluntarily entered their pleas of guilty
13.

:ounts I and II.

'

pleas.
IS.

Defendants failed to withdraw their guilty please within

111 iays.
20.

An evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's Motion to

Withdraw their gui.l*— pleas because
21.

Mr. Bucher -

^ ^ appear

ineffective counsel.
witness.

STATS V. TODD AND WILSON

22.

Defendant

PAGE FOUR

Wilson

testified

FINDINGS 5 CONCLUSIONS

at

the hearing

and

M^

testimony was contradictory to his statements made at the time >>j?
plea was taken*
23.

Defendant Todd did not testify.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concluded that the Defendants were not credible

witnesses.
2.

It "belies credibility11 to think that Defendants would

not say anything to either the Court or their counsel when the
Court SBnUencexi them to prison.
3.

The Court cannot make a finding of ineffective counsel

because there was no credible evidence presented that Mr. Bucher
was ineffective.
4.

The Court will allow Defendants to withdraw their guilty

pleas to Count I because of the omission in the Information, but
not

because

the

guilty

pleas

were

not

made

knowingly

and

voluntarily.
5.

The Court denies defendants/ Motion to Withdraw their

guilty pleas to Count II.
Dated this

£

dav of March, 1993.

..-iy_-
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JOHN A- ROKXCH
DISTRICT COURT JDDGZ
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KLfilfij|5T3fCT?r2!!T
Third Judicial District

ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK
Attorneys for Mr. Todd
KAREN J. STAM
RONALD S. FUJTNO
Attorneys for Mr. Wilson
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt LaJce City, Utah 34111
Telephone: 532-5444

FEB 2 2 1953
SALTUKECOUNTY

ay.

• i©liMi..^l
FEB23B93
I !./ / >

U UL

CQTTRT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF OTA ,
P l a i n t i f f /Appellee,

Stipulation
To Enter Affidavit
Into the Record

v.
STTVLIJ' LliCIiZlRIJ

1 JVt\

_ •

Appeal Case Mo- 920535-CA
District court No. 911901397

Defendant/Appellant*
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee ,
v.
BRYANT R, WILSON,
De fendant/ Appellant-

Appeal Case No. 920536-CA
District Court No. 911901397
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH,
THIRD DISTRICT COORT JUDGE

Come now counsel for luit? defendants nnl >. i niiiai'-il

i1 i I 'I'm

State, and hereby stipulate that the attached Affidavit of John R.
Bm

record and c o n s i d e r e d by t h i s Court

in ruling on defendants/ motions to vacate tiieir convictions.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

L bi

SKORDAS
" COUNTY ATTORNEY

^L

KAREN J. STAM
Counsellor Z&x. Wilson

iL
A£
ELIZABETH!HOL3RQOK
}J->

'•:{/4\J\\

Counsel forCMr. Todd
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

I,

r\CU.

^yX.

, hereby certify that I

delivered or mailed a copy of the foregoing to Greg Skordas of the
County Attorney's Office.

/^q.sM~_
DELIVERED B>
FEB Z 2 TO
OATAnAMSHN

2-

E1IZA2ZTH A. 30WM?.:;
Z1IZA3ZTH H0L3HC0F.
Attorneys for Mr. Tcdd
KAHiT J. STAM
?.0~A1D 5. FUJINC
Actorn*ys for !ir. Wilson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKZ LZGA1 DZFZNDZ?. ASSOCIATICi:'
424 Zast 5GC South, Suite 3CC
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-3444
IN THZ THIHD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXZ COUN*
STATZ 0? UTAJ-.

STATZ OF UTAH.
Affidavit of
John ?.. 3ucher

Plaintiff/Appellee

STEVEN RICHARD TODD.

*

Appeal Case No. 920535-CA
District Court No. 91190139".

Defeniant/Apoelian:

STATZ OF "TT,\H

*

Plamtif f/Appellee
v.
3RYANT R. WILSON.
Defendant/Appei i ar

*

Appeal Case No. 920535-CA
District Court No. 9119C1397
i HO::C?.A3LZ JOHN A. P.OXICH.
:?.2 DISTRICT COURT JUDCZ

I, JOHS ?.. 3UCH2?.. do hereby attest as follows:
1.

I was retained to represent Steven Todd in case number

912901397. involving one count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity and
multiple counts of theft by deception.
2.

The defendants entered cuilty pleas to one count of

Pattern of unlawful activity and one count of theft by deception
on December 30. 1991.
3-.

Within two days of the entry of the defendants* cuilty

pleas, both defendant's came to my office and Todd ask me to
withdraw his guilty plea.
4. I advised the defendants that the motion was premature and
that the motion should net be filed until the trial court sentenced
them.
5. The trial court sentenced the defendants on 2!arch 9.. 1992.
6.

I moved to withdraw the cuilty pleas on March 30, 1992.
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ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN (4276)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorneys for Mr. Todd
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN R. TODD,
Petitioner/Appellant,

: SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
: CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

v.

:

THE STATE OF UTAH,

: Case No. 920536-CA

Respondent/Appellee.

:

Petitioner Steven R. Todd respectfully submits this
supplemental memorandum in support of his petition for certificate
of probable cause.

This matter, as well as codefendant Bryant R.

Wilson's petition, is set for hearing on Wednesday, May 12, 1993,
at 9:00

A.M.

Mr. Wilson, by counsel, is filing a separate

supplemental memorandum.

Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson are referred to

here collectively as "petitioners."

APPELLATE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A notice of appeal for both petitioners was filed June 3,
1992.

R. 132-3. A separate pro se notice of appeal was filed June

22, 1992 by Mr. Todd and codefendant Bryant Wilson.

R. 136.

LDA

was appointed June 23, 1992. A motion for certificate of probable
cause was filed in the trial court on June 29, 1992 on petitioners'
behalf.

R. 140.

This matter was heard by the trial court on

August

8,

1992, and

transcript, R. 242-61

Judge

Rokich

denied

the

(copy attached as Exhibit A) .

appointed on August 3, 1992 as appellate counsel.
R. 150 (Wilson) .

motion.

See

LDA was

R. 151 (Todd),

LDA filed a notice of appeal in the district

court on August 13, 1992.

R. 152-3 (Todd), R. 154-5 (Wilson).

Case No. 920412-CA, a duplicate appeal involving both petitioners,
was properly dismissed for failure to file a docketing statement.
R. 301.
Petitions for Certificates of Probable Cause in the Court
of Appeals were filed August 20 (Todd) and 28 (Wilson), 1992,
together with the affidavit of Elizabeth Holbrook2
Ronald S. Fujino (Wilson) and memoranda in support.

(Todd) and
Hearing was

scheduled for September 15, 1992, but was vacated due to a problem
with service of the petition.

The Petitions and supporting

materials were refiled on September 9 and 10, 1992.
filed

a memorandum

in opposition.

A

The State

stipulated motion

for

expedited hearing was denied.
The matters were heard on October 15, 1992.

On this

court's own motion, the matters were remanded to the district court
for entry of findings concerning ineffective assistance of counsel.
R. 299.

An evidentiary hearing and argument was held in the

district court on December 14 and 21, 1992

(R. 247-86) .

The

affidavit of John R. Bucher (trial counsel for petitioners) was
x

This is a separate transcript. It is also included in the
court file at 289-93, and again at 294-98.
2

Ms. Holbrook has transferred to a trial position within LDA
and current counsel was substituted as appellate counsel in March.
2

entered into the record by stipulation. R. 320-1 (stip.), R. 322-3
(aff., copy attached as Exhibit B).

The trial court entered its

findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 5, 1993. R. 325329 (copy attached as Exhibit C) .
An additional hearing was held on March 8, 1993, and
Judge Rokich allowed withdrawal of petitioners' guilty pleas to
Count I (racketeering, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603) . R. 330 (Todd,
minute entry, copy attached as Exhibit D) , R. 3 64 (Wilson) .

An

additional notice of appeal was filed, R. 377 (Mr. Todd, Case No.
930207-CA), R. 387-8 (Mr. Wilson, Case No. 930208), and motions
were filed for each individual in this court to consolidate their
respective appeals.
For present purposes, these actions are identical.
district

court

record

for

both

these

cases

are

de

The

facto

consolidated.

FACTS
On December 30, 1991, Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson were
induced to enter pleas of guilty to a pattern of unlawful activity
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603, 2nd degree felony) and theft by
deception

(Utah Code Ann.

misinformed

§ 76-6-405, 3rd degree felony) by

(and, appellant argues, constitutionally deficient)

representations from their trial counsel.
As inducement to enter the plea, prosecutor Greg Skordas
gave trial counsel for Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson a signed letter
agreement which provided in full:
3

John,
•11 A s * ? u r t h e r indu cement to settle this case, the State
will affirmatively recommend that the defendants be
granted probation & that if they are committed, contrary
to the State's recommendation, to prison, we will
stipulate to a plea withdrawel[sic] on both defendants,
on all counts.
C/s/] Greg Skordas 12/30/91
£ge_ R. 304 (indicating this letter was submitted as an exhibit at
12/14/92 evidentiary hearing) . This letter has been attached as an
exhibit to various prior memoranda
attached as exhibit E.

(e.g. , R. 123) .

A copy is

The original is unpaginated, but is

contained in the court file between R. 12 and R. 13.
Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson were instructed by their trial
attorney, John R. Bucher3, that the prosecutor's letter agreement
to stipulate to withdrawal of the guilty pleas in the event of a
prison sentence precluded the possibility that Mr. Todd or Mr.
Wilson would serve time in prison as a result of the pleas.

R.

250-5. They were further instructed not to disclose this agreement
to the trial court.

R. 253-4.

Within a week after the pleas had been entered, Mr. Todd
and Mr. Wilson asked Mr. Bucher to withdraw their pleas.
Bucher refused to do so.

Mr.

See Bucher Affidavit, R. 322-3 at H3

(copy attached as Exhibit B) . Sentencing, originally scheduled for
January 27, 1992, was continued to March 9, 1992 to allow time for
a presentence investigation. R. 92. On March 9, 1992 Mr. Todd and
Mr. Wilson were each sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one to

3

Bucher has since been suspended for at least six months as of
May 19, 1992. See Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 5 No. 7 (August/September
1992) p. 26.
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fifteen and zero to five years.
(Wilson).

R. 102-3

(Todd), R. 105-6

On March 30, 1992 Mr. Bucher filed a motion to withdraw

petitioners' guilty pleas.

R. 109-10.

Contrary to his prior

letter agreement, Mr. Skordas opposed this motion rather than
stipulating to it.

See State's Memorandum in Opposition, R.113-

116. At hearing on May 18, 1992 (see transcript, R. 210-217), the
court took the matter under advisement.

R. 127 (Todd), R. 128

(Wilson) . On May 26, 1992 Judge Rokich denied the motion. R. 12931.

As described in Appellate Procedural History, supra, this

appeal and petition for certificate of probable cause ensued.

FINDINGS ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
A copy of the trial court's findings and conclusions on
ineffective assistance (R. 325-9) are attached as Exhibit C.
summary, the court's findings of fact are:

In

(1) defendants were

charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity and multiple counts of
Theft by Deception;

(2) & (3) John Bucher was the controlling

attorney for both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson;
was

the

prosecutor,

and

executed

the

withdrawal of pleas if committed to prison;
informed

of

this

knowledgeable, etc.;

agreement;

(7)

&

(4) & (5) Greg Skordas
letter

re:

stipulated

(6) the court was not
(8)

defendants

are

(9) one element of Count I was'omitted from

the information by the County Attorney's Office;
elements of charged offenses;

(10-12)

re:

(13) defendants stated they had no

questions re: elements of offenses;

(14-16) trial court explained

that there were no promises re: sentence (prison was possible)
5

without objection;

(17)

trial court found pleas were entered

knowingly and voluntarily;

(18-19) defendants did not request and

pleas were not withdrawn within 30 days; and

(20-23)

a hearing

was held on ineffective assistance, Mr. Wilson testified, Mr.
Bucher did not appear4 and Mr. Todd did not testify,5
In summary, the court's conclusions of law are:
defendants

were

not

credible

witnesses;

(2)

"It

(1)

'belies

credibility' to think that Defendants would not say anything to
either the Court or their counsel when the Court sentenced them to
prison.";

(3) there was "no credible evidence presented that Mr.

Bucher was ineffective";

(4) the court allows plea to Count I to

be withdrawn because of the omission in the Information; and

(5)

court denies defendants' motion to withdraw guilty pleas to Count
II.
Mr. Wilson (and by stipulation, Mr. Todd also) testified
to several matters not contained in the trial courts findings:
Q.
[by Ms. Bowman] WHAT DID THAT LETTER
TDATED 12/30/91 FROM PROSECUTOR SKORDAS1 MEAN TO YOU?
A.
TMr. Wilsonl IT MEANT TO ME, FROM LOOKING
AT IT-- AND IT WAS SIGNED BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY-REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER HAPPENED AT SENTENCING THAT OUR
ATTORNEY COULD APPROACH THE BENCH-- IS WHAT HE TOLD US-AND SHOW THIS TO THE JUDGE AND THAT OUR PLEA COULD BE
WITHDRAWN AND WE COULD TAKE THE CASE TO TRIAL, THAT WE
4

But see Affidavit of Bucher, R. 322-3 (copy attached as
Exhibit B), R. 320-1 (stipulation to enter affidavit in record).
s

But see the transcript (R. 272:12-17):
THE COURT:
ANY OTHER WITNESSES?
MS. BOWMAN:
I WOULD PUT MR. TODD ON FOR A
VERY BRIEF OUTLINE OF ABOUT THE SAME THING.
MR. SKORDAS:
I STIPULATE THAT MR. TODD, IF
ASKED THE SAME SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WOULD ANSWER IN THE
EXACT SAME FASHION, IF THAT WILL SAVE TIME.
6

WERE GUARANTEED THAT WE WON'T GO TO PRISON OR TO JAIL
BECAUSE OF THAT LETTER, AT THAT TIME, AND WE COULD TAKE
OUR CASE TO TRIAL AND IT COULD GO FROM THERE.
Q.
IF YOU TOOK IT TO TRIAL, YOU UNDERSTOOD
THAT YOU COULD GO TO PRISON IF YOU WERE FOUND GUILTY OF
IT?
A.
YES, MA'AM.
Q.
BUT THIS WAS A GUARANTEE THAT YOU COULD
NOT BE SENT TO PRISON ON A GUILTY PLEA?
A.J. EXACTLY.
O.
AND WHO TOLD YOU ABOUT THAT GUARANTEE?
A,
JOHN BUCHER. WHO WAS OUR ATTORNEY AT THE
TIME.
251:3-22 (emphasis added).
THE WITNESS:
JOHN TOLD US NOT TO TELL THE
JUDGE ABOUT THE LETTER, AND THAT WE SHOULD JUST HANG ON
TO THE LETTER UNLESS WE WERE SENT TO PRISON OR JAIL, AND
THEN AT THAT TIME HE WOULD APPROACH THE JUDGE AND SHOW
HIM THE LETTER THAT WE COULD WITHDRAW THE PLEA AT THAT
TIME, WITH THAT LETTER.
Q.
(BY MS. BOWMAN) OKAY. AND WHAT WAS THE
PURPOSE-- AND MAYBE YOU SAID THIS WHEN I WAS PASSING THE
LETTER TO THE JUDGE, BUT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE THAT YOU
THOUGHT OF NOT SHOWING THIS LETTER TO THE JUDGE?
A.
HE TOLD US NOT TO SHOW THE LETTER TO THE
JUDGE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT IF WE SHOWED THE LETTER TO THE
JUDGE, MR. SKORDAS AND MR. BUCHER, WITH THAT LETTER
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM, THAT WE'D BE STEPPING ON THE
JUDGE'S FEET; AND THAT WE JUST HAVE THIS LETTER AND THAT
IF WE WERE SENT TO JAIL OR PRISON WE COULD SHOW THEM THE
LETTER AND WITHDRAW IT. HE FELT IT MAY INSULT THE JUDGE
THAT WE WAS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE
COURTROOM.
253:6-11 (emphasis added).
Q.
WOULD YOU HAVE ENTERED THAT PLEA IF YOU
KNEW THAT THAT LETTER WAS NOT A GUARANTEE?
A.
DEFINITELY NOT. I WOULD NEVER HAVE PLED
GUILTY TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY AND A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY IF I HAD THOUGHT THAT. WE JUST WANTED TO GET IT
ALL WRAPPED UP AND OUT OF THE WAY BECAUSE WE BECAUSE WE
HAD PAID OUR ATTORNEY SO MUCH MONEY, AND EVERYTHING, AND
WE JUST WANTED TO GET IT WRAPPED UP.
Q.
WERE YOU EVER TOLD THAT A JUDGE DOES NOT
HAVE TO WITHDRAW YOUR GUILTY PLEA[?]
A.
HE TOLD US THAT REGARDLESS OF-- HOW HE
PUT IT WAS THE POWER OF THIS LETTER, THE POWER OF THIS-HE SAYS,
"YOU GUYS DO NOT REALIZE THE POWER OF THIS
LETTER." HE GOES, "REGARDLESS OF WHAT MR. ROKICH DOES-7

JUDGE ROKICH DOES AT SENTENCING, WE CAN APPROACH HIM WITH
THAT LETTER AND WE CAN CHANGE THE PLEA REGARDLESS AND YOU
WON'T GO TO JAIL OR PRISON AT THAT TIME. YOU'LL HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE IT TO TRIAL."
R. 255:5-23. Mr. Wilson testified that Mr. Bucher did not explain
the elements of racketeering or theft by deception. After entering
the pleas, Wilson looked the crimes up in the library and concluded
that he and Mr. Todd were not guilty.

He and Mr. Todd requested

that Bucher withdraw the pleas (about 6 to 8 times) , but Bucher
wouldn't, saying that the letter protected them.

R. 255-8.

By

stipulation, Mr. Todd's testimony would have been to the same
effect.

R. 272:12-17.
Mr. Bucher's affidavit is in accord with the testimony of

Messrs. Todd and Wilson.

It indicates that within a week of entry

of the guilty pleas, both defendants came to his office and asked
that the pleas be withdrawn, but Mr. Bucher "advised the defendants
that the motion was premature and that the motion should not be
filed until the trial court sentenced them."
The trial court made its concerns clear:
THE COURT:
WHAT REALLY CONCERNS ME HERE,
YOU HAD TWO DEFENDANTS WHO ARE NOT THE UNSOPHISTICATED
TYPE OF INDIVIDUALS. THEY WERE BRIGHT ENOUGH TO PUT THIS
BUSINESS TOGETHER. AND I WENT THROUGH THIS TRANSCRIPT
AND WENT THROUGH RULE 11 AND ASKED THEM ON A NUMBER OF
OCCASIONS IF THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE NO PROMISES
MADE BY THIS COURT, AND THEY DID. AND IF THEY'RE GOING
TO BE A PARTY TO THIS TYPE OF CONDUCT, THEY ARE GOING TO
PAY THE CONSEQUENCES. AND THE CONSEQUENCES ARE I'M NOT
GOING TO FIND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL NOR SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT.
AND THEY CAN'T STAND HERE AND TELL ME ONE DAY
THAT THEY UNDERSTAND AND KNOW ALL OF THIS AND I'M NOT
BOUND BY ANY REPRESENTATIONS, AND THEN COME IN AT A LATER
DATE AFTER I SENTENCE THEM AND TELL ME SOMETHING ELSE.
THE JUDGMENT WILL STAND . . .
8

R.

280:6-22.

The

court

indicated

ineffectiveness of counsel was harmless.

its

opinion

that

any

R. 282:11-13.

After the court entered its findings, an additional
hearing was held at which defense counsel objected to the court's
findings.

The following exchange occurred:

[by Ms. Stam] LAST FRIDAY-- FROM THE RECORD,
THERE WAS A BENCH CONFERENCE AFTER THE COURT SENTENCED
MR. TODD. HE WAS THE FIRST PERSON TO BE SENTENCED-- I
INQUIRED OF BOTH YOU AND MR. SKORDAS WHAT THAT BENCH
CONFERENCE ENTAILED, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE MEMORY WAS
SOMETHING TO DO WITH CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES.
I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. BUCHER TODAY WHO TELLS
ME, AT THE BENCH CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS NOT RECORDED, THAT
WHAT IN FACT OCCURRED WAS THAT HE PRESENTED TO THE COURT
A COPY OF MR. SKORDAS' STIPULATION INDICATING THAT HE HAD
AGREED THAT MR. WILSON AND MR. TODD CAN WITHDRAW THEIR
GUILTY PLEAS, OR STIPULATED THAT THEY COULD. AND HE
WOULD TESTIFY TODAY, YOUR HONOR, UNDER OATH-- AND WE
TENDER HIM TO THE COURT-- THAT THAT IS WHAT OCCURRED.
THE COURT:
LOOK, YOU KNOW, I THINK I HAVE
PRETTY WELL MADE MY POSITION CLEAR. I DON'T HAVE ANY
CREDIBILITY FROM ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE. THEY CAN'T COME HERE ONE DAY AND TELL ME ONE THING
AND COME HERE ANOTHER DAY AND TELL ME ANOTHER. JUST
WHATEVER THEY THINK IS APPROPRIATE AT THE TIME. I HAVE
FOUND THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES ARE CREDIBLE SO.
THFttEFORgr THEIR TESTIMONY TODAY IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE
MY OPINION. AND I THINK MY FINDINGS PRETTY WELL SPELL
OUT WHAT TRANSPIRED.
R. 400:16-401:15 (emphasis added).
MS. STAM:
THE ONLY OTHER THING, YOUR
HONOR, IS THE AFFIDAVIT THAT WE PREPARED ON MR. BUCHER'S
TESTIMONY, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER ONE MORE TIME IN
TERMS OF HE'S HERE TODAY AND WOULD TESTIFY UNDER OATH
THAT BOTH MR. TODD AND MR. WILSON CAME TO HIM AFTER THEY
ENTERED THEIR PLEA OF GUILTY AND BEFORE THEY WERE
SENTENCED AND ASKED HIM TO ALLOW THEM OR HELP THEM
WITHDRAW THEIR GUILTY PLEAS. AND WE WOULD ASK THE COURT
TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY OR AT LEAST ACCEPT THE AFFIDAVIT.
THE COURT:
WELL. YOU KNOW WHAT? THE FACT-BUT MY PROBLEM IS THEY DON'T HAVE ANY-- THE THREE OF THEM
DON'T HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY SO. THEREFORE. I AM NOT GOING
TO ACCEPT THAT AS BEING A TRUTHFUL STATEMENT. I'M JUST
NOT GOING TO.
9

HE MAY SIGN THE AFFIDAVIT AND YOU CAN FILE IT
AS SUCH, BUT I MADE MY FINDINGS THAT THEY'RE NOT CREDIBLE
AND I'M GOING TO STAND BY THAT FINDING.
R. 408:13-409:5 (emphasis added).
The trial court was irritated by what transpired.
Skordas

signed

the

following

statement

in

Mr.

Todd's

Mr.
plea

affidavit:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State
of Utah in the case against [handwritten! Steven Todd,
defendant.
I have reviewed this statement of the
defendant and find that the declaration, including the
elements of the offense of the charge (s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct.
No
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a
plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations
are fully contained in the statement and in the attached
plea agreement6 or as supplemented on record before the
court7. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest.
I si Gregory G. Skordas /3865
R. 76-77.

Mr. Wilson's is identical except for name of defendant.

R. 87-8. Mr. Skordas' statement was incorrect and untruthful. Mr.
Bucher instructed petitioners not to disclose the letter agreement
to the judge. They merely followed the advice and strict orders of
counsel. Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson are not culpable in the antics of
Mr. Bucher and Mr. Skordas, and should not be punished for the
transgressions of others.
It

is

essential

to note

that

petitioners

have

no

significant prior involvement with the criminal justice system.
*There was no attached plea agreement.
7

There was no supplementation on record before the court.
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While

petitioners

are

relatively

sophisticated

individuals

(especially in light of only having completed schooling through the
tenth grade, R.

75

(Todd) , and one year of college, R. 86

(Wilson)), petitioners are not criminal lawyers, had no prior
experience with criminal lawyers, and of necessity were forced to
rely on the advice (good and bad) of their hired counsel. This is
precisely why we have a constitutional right to counsel:
average accused has insufficient
present

an adequate

the

knowledge and experience to

criminal defense.

We

require adequate,

effective representation so that the accused are not punished for
the shortcomings of their counsel. In this case, Messrs. Todd and
Wilson have been and continue to be punished for the shortcomings
of their counsel, and of counsel for the State.

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE
PROBABLE CAUSE,

OF

CERTIFICATE

OF

Stay of a criminal sentence pending appeal is governed by
Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990), rather than by U.R.Cr.P. 27.
State v. Larsen. 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) . This section
provides:
77-20-10.
Grounds for detaining defendant while
appealing his conviction -- Conditions for release while
on appeal.
(1) The court shall order that a defendant who has
been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment in jail or prison, and who has filed an
appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be
detained, unless the court finds:
(a) the appeal raises a substantial question of
law or fact likely to result in:
11

(i) reversal;
(ii) an order for a new trial; or
(iii) a sentence that does not include a
term of imprisonment in jail or prison;
(b) the appeal is not for the purpose of delay;
and
(c) by clear and convincing evidence presented
by the defendant that he is not likely to flee the
jurisdiction of the court, and will not pose a
danger to the physical, psychological, or financial
and economic safety or well-being of any other
person or the community if released.
This appeal raises at least one substantial question of law or fact
likely to result in reversal or a new trial, is not for the purpose
of delay, and Mr. Todd is not likely to flee or pose a danger to
individuals

or

the

community.

Mr. Todd

should

be granted

a

certificate of probable cause.

II.

MERITS OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL,

This appeal raises the following issues:
1.
Does the prosecutor's failure to comply
with the terms of the plea agreement require the
withdrawal of the guilty plea?
2.
Does ineffective assistance of trial
counsel in the plea process require the withdrawal of the
guilty pleas?
3.
Does
defendant's
misapprehension
concerning the possibility of incarceration render the
pleas involuntary and require their withdrawal?
4.
Does the plea affidavit and plea colloquy
fail to comport with the requirements of Rule 11 and fail
to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary entry of the
pleas, requiring withdrawal of the pleas?
Each of these issues is sufficient to require a reversal.
To prevail on his petition for a certificate of probable cause, Mr.

12

Todd need only show that one of these issues raises a substantial
question of law or fact likely to result in reversal.

A.

PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE
TERMS OF TEE PLEA AGREEMENT.

The prosecutor's agreement (to stipulate to withdrawal of
the pleas if the court, contrary to the State's recommendation,
recommends incarceration) is properly in the record, and the trial
court

specifically

found

that

the

prosecutor

executed

the

agreement. Factual Finding 5. Nevertheless, the State opposed Mr.
Todd's

motion

to

withdraw

the pleas.

R.

113-116

(State's

Memorandum in Opposition).
A prosecutor's failure to keep a plea agreement requires
withdrawal of the plea, as does the accused's entry of a guilty
plea on the basis of a misunderstanding of the value of the
prosecutor's agreement.

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-6

(Utah 1988) ("It is well established that a prosecutor may not make
promises which induce a guilty plea and then refuse to keep those
promises.11).

"If the court or the prosecutor refuses to comply

with the terms of the plea [after acceptance] , the defendant may
choose to withdraw the plea.
comply

with

the

terms

of

The trial court may not refuse to
the

accepted

agreement

unless

circumstances justify the declaration of a misplea; otherwise, the
double jeopardy clause will preclude a subsequent trial of the
defendant."

State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986).

The

State in this case is attempting to hold Mr. Todd to his agreement,
without

upholding

its part

of
13

the

bargain

to

stipulate

to

withdrawal of the guilty pleas if the sentence imposed includes
incarceration.

This issue is substantial, is likely to result in

a reversal, and justifies issuance of a certificate of probable
cause in this case.

B.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
IN TEE PLEA PROCESS.

The trial court found that

ft

[t]he Court cannot make a

finding of ineffective counsel because there was no credible
evidence presented that Mr. Bucher was ineffective." This factual
finding is contrary to all the evidence presented.8

The court's

credibility determination is an abuse of discretion, and its
factual finding is clearly erroneous.
The State has stipulated to the existence of the Skordas
letter, and the court found that it was executed by Skordas.

The

existence of this letter raises substantial questions regarding the
adequacy

and effectiveness of the representation

petitioners.

received by

Furthermore, there is no testimony or evidence

controverting the statements of petitioners and their counsel as to
the representations and advice given by Mr. Bucher to petitioners.
Under the circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial
court

to

completely

discredit

all

three

witnesses.

Other

jurisdictions would so hold:
It is a well-established rule in Arizona in
civil cases that the trier of fact may not arbitrarily
8

The State did not call any witnesses, nor cross-examine any
witnesses.
All testimony presented was proffered by the
defendants.
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reject uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence from a
disinterested witness where nothing in the evidence or
the circumstances casts suspicion on it. The rule is
equally applicable to criminal cases. A reviewing court
will scrutinize to determine if there was any justifiable
basis on which the trier of fact could have distrusted
testimony, but where there is none, that testimony cannot
be disregarded even by a jury.
State v. Roberts, 673 P.2d 974 (Ariz. App. 1983).
Mr. Bucher is disinterested.
trial counsel for defendants.

In this case,

His only relationship is as former
In fact, Mr. Bucher may have an

interest in not disclosing facts concerning his ineffectiveness, in
order

to protect

believed.

his own interests.

His testimony must be

The testimony of petitioners is consistent, coherent,

and uncontradicted, and follows directly from the existence of the
letter. Mr. Bucher's misconduct and weaknesses are only being held
against petitioners.

The trial court has found that he has no

credibility with the court as a result of his failure to disclose
the letter agreement to the court, and his advice to his clients to
withhold information from the court. Inexplicably, the trial court
is unwilling to extend that deficient, perhaps unprofessional
conduct to a determination that petitioners have been deprived of
constitutionally adequate representation.

The judge's factual

finding that there was no ineffective assistance, and if there was
it was harmless, is contrary not only to the great weight of the
evidence, but to ALL the evidence.
The only Utah case law addressing ineffective assistance
of counsel in plea proceedings is State v. Ford. 793 P.2d 397 (Utah
1991) .

Ford establishes the constitutional right to counsel in

IS

plea proceedings, but fails to delineate specific duties of counsel
during the course of plea proceedings.
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must
show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064
, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); see also State v. Tenrolin, 805 P.2d
182, 186 (Utah 1990).
Mr. Bucher's advice that petitioners should not inform
the

trial

court

of

the

State's

agreement

(to stipulate

to

withdrawal) was unsound and deficient. His advice to enter a plea
agreement

based

on

an undisclosed

side

agreement

concerning

withdrawal of the guilty pleas was unsound and deficient.

His

failure to withdraw petitioners' guilty pleas when requested by
petitioners to do so is deficient performance.

The legal advice

Mr. Bucher gave (to wait until after sentencing to withdraw) was
unsound and deficient.

Counsel's failure to seek or obtain an

extension of time for moving to withdrawal, so that petitioners
could be sentenced prior to expiration of the time allowed for
moving to withdrawal, was deficient. On the whole, petitioners did
not receive effective assistance from their counsel.
Finally, petitioners have been prejudiced. Had the court
been informed of the State's agreement, the court would either have
accepted the conditional plea, or declined to accept it.
16

Had it

been accepted, petitioners would not have had to serve time in
prison.

Had

the

court

rejected

the conditional

plea,

then

petitioners would be entitled to a trial by jury, together with its
incident constitutional protections. Only upon a verdict of guilty
would petitioners have run the risk of incarceration.
event,

Mr.

Bucher's

deficient

performance

has

In either
prejudiced

petitioners.
The trial court disagrees:
THE COURT:
STRICKLAND, THE STRICKLAND CASE,
RIGHT.
AND THE OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE ANY DIFFERENT
WHETHER THEY HAD INEFFECTIVE OR EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
MS. STAM:
YOUR HONOR, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE
ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT.
THE COURT:
NO IT WOULDN'T.
MS. STAM:
THESE PEOPLE WERE PROMISED THAT
IF THEY PLED GUILTY THEY WOULDN'T GO TO PRISON; THEY
WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY THEN TO GO TO TRIAL. NOW,
PERHAPS THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND WOULD HAVE
GOTTEN PRISON, BUT THAT'S THE OUTCOME THAT WOULD BE
DIFFERENT. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED THEIR PLEAS HAD
THEY BEEN TOLD BY THEIR LAWYER AND THE JUDGE AND THE
PROSECUTOR THAT A STIPULATION BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT
BINDING, BUT THEY-THE COURT:
DO YOU KNOW WHAT'S STRANGE?
•

• •

NO, AS I SAID, I'VE HEARD ALL THE ARGUMENT I'M
GOING TO HEAR. JUDGMENT STANDS AND WE'LL GO FROM THERE,
R. 282:11-283:15-

The trial court is confused.

He is certainly

correct when he states that he personally would not have accepted
a conditional plea. However, if the no incarceration guarantee was
not

in

place,

petitioners

would

not

have

pled

guilty,

and

incarceration would only be a possibility upon conviction by jury.
Petitioners believed the judge when he stated he could sentence
them to prison.

However, petitioners believed, based on advice of

counsel, that the court would have to honor the State's stipulation
17

to withdrawal of the pleas if incarceration were ordered, and
consequently there was an absolute, unconditional guarantee in
place that they would not be incarcerated without first going to
trial.
Counsel was ineffective, this issue is substantial, is
likely to result

in a reversal, and justifies issuance of a

certificate of probable cause in this case.

C.

MISAPPREHENSION
CONCERNING
THE
POSSIBILITY OF INCARCERATION RENDERS THE
PLEAS INVOLUNTARY.

To the extent that the guilty pleas were entered as a
result of petitioners' misinformed belief that they were immune
from incarceration, they are involuntary and should be withdrawn.
See, e.g.. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-6 (Utah 1988);
Machibroda v. United States. 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510,

,

7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478 (1962) ("A guilty plea, if induced by promises
or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is
void.").
In Machibroda,

petitioner alleged

that

he had been

promised "that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more
than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both informations. These
promises were said to have been made upon the authority of the
United States Attorney and to be agreeable to the District Judge.
It was alleged that the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell
his own lawyer about the conversations."
, 7 L.Ed.2d at 476.
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Id. at 489, 82 S.Ct. at

This case is quite similar to Machibroda. although the
players' positions are somewhat changed.

Messrs, Todd and Wilson

were promised by the prosecutor's letter that they would not have
to serve time in jail or prison.

In both cases, the judge was not

informed of the details of the promises. Petitioners were sworn to
secrecy (by the US attorney in Machibroda, and by defense counsel
here) .
The Supreme Court held:
There will always be marginal cases, and this
case is not far from the line. But the specific and
detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while
improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be
incredible. If the allegations are true, the petitioner
is clearly entitled to relief.
Id. at 496, 82 S.Ct. at

, 7 L.Ed.2d at 479.

In this case,

petitioners allegations are true, and they are entitled to relief.
Their guilty pleas should be withdrawn.
This issue is substantial, is likely to result in a
reversal, and justifies issuance of a certificate of probable cause
in this case.

D.

INADEQUATE PLEA AFFIDAVIT AND COLLOQUY.

The trial court, on remand, admitted that the affidavit
and colloquy were inadequate with respect to Count I, racketeering,
and allowed petitioners to withdraw their pleas to that count. On
Count

II,

the

affidavits

and

colloquys

fail

to

show

that

petitioners understood the elements of the crimes to which they
pled guilty. The affidavits and colloquys further fail to disclose
the terms of the plea agreement, in violation of Rule 11(5)(f).
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"Concern for the legitimacy or truth of a guilty plea is
an integral part of ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea.
Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e) (2)9 requires the court to find that a guilty
plea is voluntarily made before it accepts it.
cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed.fl

A guilty plea

State v. Breckenridcre.

688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983).
The plea affidavit signed by Steven Todd states:
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am
charged are as follows: [handwritten!as a group there was
direct or indirect participation in an enterprise that
functions through a pattern of unlawful activity.
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons
for which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the
elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows:
[handwritten! I helped participate in a car brokerage
that had as a pattern of activity theft bv deception on
customers seeking a car
R. 72. Mr. Wilson's plea affidavit is similar, R. 83. Nothing in
this

statement

indicates

"obtain [] or exercised

that petitioners

had the

control over property of another by

deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990).

intent to

Utah Code

The plea colloquy likewise fails to show

intent:
THE COURT:
AND THE FACTS IN THIS CASE ARE
THAT, MR. TODD, YOU STATE THAT YOU HELPED PARTICIPATE IN
A CAR BROKERAGE THAT HAD A PATTERN OF ACTIVITY THEFT BY
DECEPTION ON CUSTOMERS SEEKING A CAR; IS THAT CORRECT?
THE DEFENDANT TODD:
YES SIR.
R. 184:1-6.

These statements are tautological.

Mr. Todd pled

guilty, but did not express the intent required by law.

Currently designated 11(5) (b) .
20

Similar problems exist with respect to disclosure of the
terms of the plea agreement. See U.R.Cr.P 11(5) (f) . This issue is
fully briefed in Mr. Wilson's memorandum, and is incorporated here
by reference.
This issue is substantial, is likely to result ' in a
reversal, and justifies issuance of a certificate of probable cause
in this case.

III. THIS APPEAL IS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELAY,
This appeal is not for the purpose of delay.

There is

strong merit to the points raised by appellants. Indeed, the trial
court's reluctant acquiescence in withdrawal of each petitioner's
plea to racketeering (Count I) indicates that even the trial judge
admits that this appeal, as originally filed, was unquestionably
meritorious.

IV.

Remaining issues on appeal are also meritorious.

MR. TODD IS NOT LIKELY TO FLEE THE
JURISDICTION, AND POSES NO DANGER TO ANYONE.

Mr. Todd currently has a parole date of September, 1993.
Mr. Todd's appellate counsel has received requests from the parole
board confirming that the second degree felony plea has been
withdrawn, and as a result thereof Mr. Todd may receive an earlier
date.

Mr. Bryant is currently on parole without incident.
Mr. Todd has twice been released on his own recognizance

to pretrial services, after being charged, and after entry of his
guilty pleas but before sentencing. His past record of compliance
(as well as that of his codefendant) is clear and convincing
21

evidence that he may again be released to pretrial services without
incident.
CONCLUSION
This appeal raises four substantial issues likely to
result in reversal, and only one such issue is required.
appeal is not for purposes of delay.

This

Mr. Todd is not a threat to

flee the jurisdiction, and poses no danger to others.

This court

should grant Mr. Todd a certificate of probable cause. This court
should order that Mr. Todd be released to pretrial services.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of May, 1993.

ROBERT K. HEtNEMAN
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to
be delivered to DAVID B. THOMPSON, Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 6th day of May,
1993.

Robert K. Heineman
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